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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
matter it may be imprudent to wait for the judiciary to strike them
down. Because in this state the voting restrictions combine with
inequitable assessment practices and other inefficiencies created as
by-products of the property tax system,37 the most inspired remedy
would be major constitutional reform.
COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION-
A COPYRIGHT INFRINGER
Plaintiff licensed its copyrighted motion pictures to a television
broadcasting station. Defendant, a Community Antenna Television'
(CATV) System, received the station's broadcast, amplified the signal,
Because the 40% validation requirement is based on the last preceding general
election, i.e. the last general election in the district, absurd disparities result. See
Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Odell, 54 Wn. 2d 728, 344 P.2d 715 (1959) and see 59-60
WASH. Ops. ATT'Y. GEN. No. 133 (1960). In Seattle, for example, the 1965 excess
levy required 106,000 votes for validation because the last general election happened
to be the 1964 presidential election; the 1966 excess levy required only 40,500 votes for
validation because only 101,000 votes were cast in the last (1965) general election.
See WASHINGTO,, EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH IN EDUCATION Vol. 9, No. 3
(1966). Such indefensible disparity results from the totally arbitrary nature of this
aspect of the system.
Additional inequities result from the county assessors' disregard of the constitu-
tional mandate to assess at fifty per cent of true value of the property. See WASH.
CONST. art. 7, § 2, amend. 17 (1944). Not one assessor in the state satisfies the
constitutional requirement, see VASHINGTON STATE TAX COMISSlION, COUNTY
RATIO EQUALIZATION STUDY: 1966 ASSESSMIENT (1966), and since Clark v. Seiber,
48 Wn. 2d 783, 296 P2d 680 (1956), where the state supreme court invalidated an
effort by the legislature to give the state board of equalization the power to bring
valuations closer to the fifty per cent requirement, the matter has remained com-
pletely under the control of individual assessors, who demonstrate no willingness to
change. Subsequent efforts by the state to bring assessment practices into con-
formity with the constitutional requirement have been merely persuasive and not
very effectual, see Harsh, 7he WIashington Tax System-How It Grew, 39 WASH.
L. REv. 944 (1965), with the result, inter alia, that property of residents in one tax-
ing district is assessed at a different rate than property of residents in other taxing
districts. See Comment, 66 UTAH L. REV. 491 (1966), for a discussion of assessment
practices strikingly similar to those in Washington and for a discussion of recom-
mended changes. See also Tiedman, Fractional Assessments-Do Our Courts Sane-
tion Ilquality?, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 573 (1965), for a discussion of the inequities
created by fractional assessment. A harmful side effect of the assessment practices
in Washington has been the frequent need to resort to the excess levy as a source of
revenue for the individual taxing districts. See WASHINGTON EDUCATION AssocIA-
TION, RESEARCH iN EDUCATION Vol. 9, No. 3 (1966) for an indication of the scope of
the reliance throughout the state on the excess levy as a source of revenue.
' See text accompanying note 36 supra.
'Community Antenna Television (CATV) systems are a communications ad-
vancement which allows television reception in fringe areas where reception would
be virtually impossible without a CATV system. CATV systems are a burgeoning
industry. In January 1965 there were 1,600 systems in the United States and the
number has been increasing at a rate of approximately forty systems per month.
Hearings Before the Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., Ist Sess., ser. 8, pt. 1, at 35 (1966).
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and retransmitted it via coaxial cable to paying subscribers operating
their own television sets in private homes and places of business.
Plaintiff brought suit under the Copyright Act,2 alleging infringement
on grounds that defendant had unlawfully performed plaintiff's copy-
righted work. Held: Copyright protection of motion pictures extends
to movies shown in private homes and places of business by means of
CATV systems operated for profit.' United Artists Television, Inc. v.
Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The Copyright Act, section 1 gives a copyright holder the exclusive
right to "play or perform [the copyrighted work] in public for profit
... or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever."' In
Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.,' receipt by a hotel and distribution
to its guests by means of speakers in private rooms and hotel lounges
of an unauthorized broadcast of a copyrighted song was deemed a
"performance" within the meaning of section 1. This holding was
subsequently extended in Society of European Stage Authors & Coin-
posers, Inc. v. New York Statler Co.,' to include playing copyrighted
music in private hotel rooms even when the original station broadcast
was authorized. The principal case represents the first consideration
of the Copyright Act and these decisions in the context of CATV
systems.
In the principal case the court reasoned that by receiving and re-
transmitting signals via coaxial cables, defendant committed acts
amounting to performance, because CATV amplifies, modulates, and
superimposes the station's television signal on a new carrier wave
generated by the CATV system. The court differentiated this "active"
operation from reception and forwarding of station signals by a simple
antenna system. Because CATV, in its process, actually created its
own television signals, it was held to have "performed" the copyrighted
work. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily upon the
Buck and Statler cases, treating them essentially as controlling prece-
dent on the question of whether the CATV activity constituted "per-
-17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
' Bills were introduced into the 89th Congress which would expressly make CATV
systems for profit subject to the Copyright Act § 1, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), S. 1006,
H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6836, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966). These
bills were within Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary at
adjournment of the 89th Congress.
'17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
283 U.S. 191 (1931).
'19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
[ VOL. 42: 621
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formance" within section 1 of the Copyright Act.7 Simultaneously,
however, the court recognized that CATV represented a truly new and
unique communications technique, never before brought within the
purview of the Copyright Act. It stated that the case demanded
"statutory construction . . . that will accommodate the underlying
legislative purpose and the realities of modern communications tech-
nology,"' and further, that the Copyright Act should be interpreted
to "be reasonable in that it would not lead to an absurd, unfair, or
shocking result."9 Therefore, while viewing Buck and Statler as con-
trolling, the court recognized that the issues warranted careful con-
sideration, as indicated by its statement that "the evidence is technical
and this case presents important questions of first impression . ... "'I
An undesireable result of the principal case is the construction which
it placed upon the Copyright Act. The court established a precedent
for mechanical interpretation of the act, seemingly made more in vacuo
than in light of "realities of modern communications technology," the
ostensible criterion of the court. Since the Copyright Act antedated
CATV, it is impossible to determine whether the act's general language
was intended to encompass CATV. While unambiguous statutory
language should be given its literal meaning, the Copyright Act's
general terms should have compelled application of the rule that
ambiguous statutes should be construed to avoid "absurd, unjust, or
inconvenient" results."
An opposite result in the principal case would have been preferable
in several important respects. It is submitted that copyright holders'
economic interests in restricted use of their work are amply protected
by the bargaining process attendant film licensing to broadcasting
stations, without bringing CATV operations within the ambit of the
Copyright Act. Television transmission is supported almost entirely
by commercial advertising during broadcasts, and prices commanded
for advertising time increase with the number of viewers. Therefore,
use of any device which enlarges potential viewing audiences will create
additional station revenue from advertising. As copyright holders'
royalties are largely a product of the revenue-producing capabilities
'Epstein, Copyright Protection and Community Antenna Television Systems,
19 FED. Com. B.J. 97, 101 (1964-1965), made the same argument.
'255 F. Supp. at 180.
0 Id. at 203.
'Id. at 180.
1 Cwxxas, STATUTE LAw 86-90 (6th ed. 1963).
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of the copyrighted material, it follows that benefits from audiences
increased by innovations such as CATV will tend to inure to the copy-
right holders as well as to CATV operators and original broadcasters. 2
The principal case is an unnecessary and undesirable extension of
Buck and Statler to a novel and distinct communications industry.
Buck and Statler should not be considered as controlling precedent
for CATV because there is no similarity between multiple radio
speakers in a hotel, and the complexities of CATV. In Buck and
Statler the interested parties were copyright holder, broadcasting sta-
tion, hotel operator, and hotel patrons. The hotel's primary service is
to lodge its patrons, not to relay radio music to them. The hotel
business goes on, notwithstanding those cases. Buck and Statler do not
adversely affect either hotel or patron, and the merits of those holdings
rest solely upon a determination of whether the copyright holder's
interests were injured. The holding of the principal case, on the other
hand, adversely affects both CATV and its subscribers.
CATV, in bargaining for a license, is at the mercy of copyright
holders. CATV's bargaining position differs from that of broadcasting
stations. Broadcasters have a wide selection of copyrighted films for
programming purposes, and the bargain made between the broadcaster
and copyright holder is determined by station demand and availability
of suitable feature films. CATV enjoys no such liquidity of supply,
however, being limited in its broadcasts to programs offered by those
original broadcasters whose channels the CATV system is equipped to
receive and retransmit, unless it is able to substitute "fill-in" programs.
Under the rule established by the principal case, the copyright holder
may exert a death grip upon any CATV operation which intends to
retransmit its copyrighted work. While it may be possible for such a
CATV operator to obtain a license from the copyright holder, the
CATV operator would be strongly disadvantaged because his choice
would be either to accept the copyright holder's demand or drop the
program. This problem is compounded by the short period of time
allowed a CATV operator to reach agreement with the copyright
holder, because the time between licensing to the original broadcaster
and actual broadcast may be short.
"
2This is premised upon a macroscopic view of the entire television industry.
The question remains whether or not operation of economic forces in this overall
fashion will necessarily assure a particular copyright holder increased royalties for
his license grant. Whether this possibility of individual detriment justifies applica-
tion of copyright restrictions to CATV generally, is primarily a value judgment.
[ VOL. 42 : 621
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The countervailing issues of public policy were far less significant
in Buck and Statler than in the principal case because CATV now
plays an important role in communications, giving some fringe area
viewers their only means of reception. Hotel radio systems fail to serve
the valuable public interest in wider geographic availability of com-
munications media promoted by CATV. Furthermore, the principal
case may be distinguishable from Buck and Statler,13 because there,
the hotels owned and operated the entire radio system, from the master
receiver to individual room speakers. CATV, however, neither owns
nor operates the television sets upon which the copyrighted films are
viewed. For this reason, CATV systems may be regarded in their
effect as an adjunct to home television sets,'4 more analogous to rooftop
antennas then to the complete, closed systems at issue in Buck and
Statler.
The expected Federal Communications Commission regulation of
CATV operations"s should curb any abuses of interests which deserve
protection. For example, CATV systems are capable of deleting
advertisements from the original broadcast, and substituting their own
revenue-producing commercials. They may also bring original broad-
casts of such programs as sporting events into areas "blacked-out"
pursuant to agreements between promoters of the event and the origi-
nal broadcaster. Damage thus done to advertisers, promoters of spec-
tator events, and original broadcasters could be averted by appropriate
regulations, as could any possibility of CATV unfair advantage over
" Any distinction between CATV and Buck on the ground that the performance
in Brick was of an unauthorized broadcast of copyrighted matter and CATV re-
transmits only duly licensed matter is not valid, since in Statler, the rebroadcasting
was of an authorized original broadcast. For an example of such an invalid distinc-
tion, see Comment, Television Broadcasting and Copyright Law: The Comnzunity
Antenna Telcvisions Controversy, 41 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 225, 233-34 (1966).
14 See Lilly v. United States, 238 F.2d 584, 587-88 (4th Cir. 1956) :
We think it clear that this community antenna service was a mere adjunct of
the television receiving sets with which it was connected ....
It [the antenna system] merely furnished an attachment to a television receiving
set which enables a set disadvantageously located to operate like an ordinary
set ....
The issue in Lilly was whether a tax levied upon commercial communications
services should also be levied upon CATV. The court reasoned that if the tax were
imposed, it would amount to a tax upon television equipment because CATV sub-
stituted for a home rooftop antenna. This is a tax case, but the reasoning is
nevertheless applicable.
For further argument that generation of electro-magnetic impulses does not
constitute a copyright infrining performance, see Keller, Is Community Antenna
Television a Copyright Infringer?, 43 U. DEr. L.J. 367, 369-71 (1966).
" On February 16, 1966, the FCC announced that it would promulgate rules
placing CATV systems under FCC jurisdiction. FCC Docket No. 15971, 30 F.R.
6078 (1965).
1967 ]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
copyright holders." FCC regulation of CATV, if it is designed to
adequately protect copyright holders' interests, is preferable to exten-
sion of the Buck and Statler decisions to an entirely new area where
the issues are distinct from these cases.
EXTENSION OF THE SULLIVAN RULE
TO NON-OFFICIAL PUBLIC FIGURES
On two separate occasions, Dr. Linus Pauling sued news services for
libel. In one case, involving a magazine which had identified Dr.
Pauling as a communist without proof of the accusation, his libel action
was dismissed by a New York court. In the second case, an editorial
in defendant's newspaper falsely reported that Dr. Pauling had been
cited for contempt of Congress. He had failed to comply with a con-
gressional demand for a list of associates who had aided him in cir-
culating a petition against nuclear testing, but was never actually cited
for contempt. A federal district court's verdict for defendant was
affirmed on the merits by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In
both cases, held: If a person engages in public debate on controversial
and grave issues or attempts to guide public policy, any criticism of
such activity, free from actual malice,1 is privileged. Pauling v. Na-
tional Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct.
1966); Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th
Cir. 1966), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3082 (U.S. Sept.
6, 1966) (No. 522).
Adopting the minority rule,2 the Supreme Court in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan applied the first and fourteenth amendments to state
"For a discussion of FCC regulations already imposed upon CATV see Zylstra,
Regulation of Community Antenna Television: Assertion of Jurisdiction by the
FCC, 3 LAW NoTEs No. 1 (Oct. 1966).
'The courts in the principal cases adopted the definition of "actual malice" found
in New York Times Co, v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964): a statement made
"with knowledge that it was false or with a reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."
2 Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908), represented the minority
rule prior to Sullivan. By adopting Coleman, the holding in Sullivan was not only
a change in the substantive law of defamation, but was the initial application of the
constitutional protections of freedom of speech and press to state defamation laws.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 256; Noel, Defamation of
Public Offcers and Candidates, 49 COLu-m. L. Rav. 875, 901-03 (1949); Pedrick,
Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Translation, 49 CORMELL
L.Q. 581, 587 (1964) ; Note, Recent Developments Concerning Constitutional Limita-
tions on, State Defamation Laws, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1429, 1435-41 (1965).
[ VOL. 42: 621
